The Reaction of the Jewish Public in Germany to the Nuremberg Laws
Source: A. Margaliot, ΓÇ£The Reaction of the Jewish Public in Germany to the Nuremberg LawsΓÇ¥, Yad Vashem Studies , Vol. 12, pp. 75 - 107
In promulgating the Nuremberg laws on September 15, 1935, the National socialist Government's purpose was to implement its decision to deprive the Jews of their status as citizens of the State and to separate them irrevocably, both politically and racially, from the German population. German Jewry's reaction to this illustrates the trends, which guided its organisations and institutions in contending with government hostility. It also indicates the extent to which the total erosion of Emancipation had, by the autumn of 1935, become the pivot of German Jewry's thinking and action.
The Non-Zionist Camp .
The largest organisation in this category was "The Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith" (Central-Verein deutscher Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens - C.V.), which had been founded in 1893. Its members aspired to integration of Jews in German society, but strongly opposed relinquishing their religion. They fought against any attempt to prejudice the Jews' rights while reiterating their loyalty to the fatherland, Germany. When anti-Semitic persecution began, the leaders of the Central-Verein co-operated with the Zionist organisations in order to forge German Jewish unity.
Anti-Zionist organisations such as The Union of Jewish Front Veterans ( Reichsbund Juedischer Frontsoldaten - RjF) were also prominent. A special position was held by Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden , which was headed by bankers and industrialists who had declared themselves to be neutral, and within whose administration the Zionists had no influence. This organisation dealt with the procedure of emigration except for that to Palestine, for which the Palestine Office in Berlin was responsible. This distribution of tasks had been agreed on by the two institutions.
The Nuremberg Laws constituted a severe blow for these groups, which had grown accustomed to considering Emancipation as the basis for their existence. It is nevertheless extremely difficult to discover their reaction to what was happening. Some weeks previously, at the order of the authorities, the publication of their organ, C.V Zeitung (CV Z.) had been temporarily suspended and in the spring of that year Gestapo surveillance of their spokesmen had been intensified. Some of them had been deprived of the right to speak in public as a penalty for encouraging their co-religionists to remain in Germany rather than urging them to emigrate.
We do not have any evidence to indicate whether the leaders of the Central Association (CV) met in September in order to define its stand concerning the new laws. Eleven days later, however, its organ began to appear again, and the first issue after a break of two months contained a leading article on the subject of the Nuremberg Laws. The article stated: 'Not only are we taking leave of the [Jewish] year, which has come to an end, but also of an epoch in history, which is now drawing to its close.' 1 Rather than attacking the government, the author criticised the Zionists, who he claimed had welcomed the laws with a sense of triumph. He advised the Zionists to bewail the fact that their gloomy prophecies had been fulfilled; it would have been better for them had they said: 'Woe to us for we have been victorious.' 2 The impression one gains is that the Central-Verein preferred to encourage its members to stay put rather than urging them to leave the country. However, it was obliged to proceed with caution and to avoid a head-on collision with the authorities. Consequently, a decision was made to publish verbatim pronouncements made by the Heads of State, and at the beginning of December 1935 a series of statements, some of which will be cited below, appeared in the Union's organ.
Special emphasis was given to the pronouncement made by the Minister of the Interior, Frick, in the "Organ of German JuristsΓÇ¥, to the effect that: 'The Citizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of the Race and the regulations concerning their implementation are not intended to harm the members of the Jewish race on the grounds of racial origin. The Jews will not be deprived of the possibility of living in Germany.' Ministerialrat Loesener asserted that the Nuremberg Laws were intended 'to constitute a beginning to the tranquillisation of relations between the German and Jewish peoples. As an outcome of the new reality, in which the Jewish sphere will henceforth be separated from the German one, a tolerable co-existence will be possible between the two nations within the same political area.' Loesener added that: 'For the Jews in Germany this separation means that they will be legally protected, since in future they will live within the German territory in the region designated for them by the State.' Moreover, passages were cited from the speech made by Dr. Hans Frank at the Academy of German Law: 'The publication of the Nuremberg Laws brings to an end, for the moment, the process of revolutionary development in Germany. I would just like to emphasise the fact that the Jews will be able to remain and to function unhindered as a Jewish body. We will, however, prevent any association with that race, which is racially alien to us.' 3 It would seem that the members of the Central Association (CV) attempted to give prominence to statements made by the German leaders which emphasised the possibility of continued Jewish existence within the Third Reich.
There are no data to indicate the reaction of the Union of Jewish Front Veterans (RjF), which was a fervently patriotic body; its leaders appear to have opted for silence. They had waged their principal battle against having their rights revoked in the spring of 1935, when they had done their utmost to be allowed to serve in the newly-emerging German army. When these efforts failed they seem to have despaired of being able to maintain the remnants of their rights, which dated from the era of the Emancipation. In their journal, Der Schild , issue of September 1935 4 , they preferred to preserve silence rather than expressing their pain at the government's decisions, which cut them to the quick. In internal discussions, however, they did not remain silent. This is proved by the Report of the Association of Hamburg Communities, according to which the representatives of the non-Zionists spoke their minds plainly. In a discussion held in the Community's Council 5 on September 24, 1935, the "National Representation of Jews in Germany" ( Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden ) was attacked for asserting that under the prevailing circumstances emigration could serve as a solution to the problem. It was claimed, in opposition to this, that a large section of Jewish youth had decided to fight for its position in Germany, refusing to be deflected from this path. Statements like these addressed to a closed meeting, reflected the mood of extremist patriotic and assimilationist groups, such as the RjF. and others like it, which could not express their views openly.
Although the non-Zionist organisations continued to believe in the ideals they had always held, they did not ignore the fact that the exigencies of the situation required them to find ways of emigrating and transferring their property abroad. This meant that their desire to be integrated within German society related to the long term, while for the present, given the prevailing circumstances, they preferred to adopt a pragmatic approach. Evidence of this ambivalent attitude is provided by the records of the Regensburg Community (kehilla): 'The Jews of Germany are firmly bound to their fatherland and desire to remain there, knowing that the fate of the country is one with their own. This is not possible, however, in the present circumstances, and it is therefore necessary to emigrate. It is the duty of the Hilfsverein to prepare the way for emigration of this nature, and to extend assistance to those who make the difficdecision to leave their fatherland and establish their home anew outside the borders of Germany.' 6 The Organisation wanted to direct this movement to countries abroad, but not to Palestine, as is evinced by their lack of enthusiasm for the Zionist effort even when it became necessary to take up the wanderer's staff.
In this context a closer examination of the activities and methods of the Hilfsverein is indicated. For a long time previously, it had helped Jews to emigrate from Germany but at the same time it considered it its duty to discourage applicants from taking this step if their future abroad was not guaranteed. With the Nuremberg Laws this approach seems to have altered, though it did not disappear entirely. The Hilfsverein's Report 7 notes that in the wake of the events of September 1935 the number of applicants for emigration increased considerably. In Berlin alone the number had reached 4,000 persons per month 8 . The situation called for the expansion of facilities and an increased search for solutions. The Hilfsverein tried to meet the requirements of the hour, but the concept of rescue, involving the hasty departure from Germany of large numbers of Jews, was alien to its leaders. Its members continued their efforts to guarantee that candidates for emigration were thoroughly prepared beforehand, in order to assure their future absorption abroad. Courses in English, Portuguese and Spanish were introduced for these people and lectures were held on the conditions, climate, economy, etc. of the new countries 9 . Their basic approach can be gathered from the publication of an extensively detailed news-sheet covering dozens of countries, and outlining the immigration laws in each one as well as rights of permanent or temporary residence, conditions for obtaining work-permits and employment, wage-levels, living conditions, citizenship laws, the problems of agricultural settlement, social and cultural aspects and other useful information. Four hundred agents throughout the world participated in gathering this information, sending detailed reports to Berlin. The material was presented in Korrespondenzblatt ueber Auswanderungs- und Siedlungswesen , which was distributed in thousands of copies.
During this period the Hilfsverein stressed the need to direct emigrants to countries across the sea and not to the European countries, where the chances of absorption seemed limited 10 . For this purpose close co-operation was maintained with such organisations as HICEM, the Joint, JCA and other bodies in the Jewish world which provided aid. The solutions available for those interested in emigrating were nevertheless inadequate, and the heads of the Hilfsverein felt themselves obliged to devote much of the September 1935 issue, in which the Nuremberg Laws were published, to an elucidation of the various difficulties holding up the entry of emigrants to many countries. 11 The Ministry of Finance, drawing up a far-reaching plan of action for emigration and salvaging property. His connections with Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, and with German financial leaders stood him in good stead. Warburg was highly regarded by German Jewry as well as by Jewish leaders in Western Europe and the U.S. He maintained close contact with his brother, Felix Warburg, a prominent banker in the United States, who served as president of the Joint, as well as with Lionel Rothschild, who conveyed his opinions at the meetings of Anglo-Jewish Organizations 12 . Warburg's association with these groups gave added authority to his suggestions on financing emigration. Simon Marks was convinced that as a result of Max Warburg's actions the German authorities gave the topics discussed with him more serious attention than ever before 13 . This is illustrated by the internal correspondence between the various ministries. The language used by the Ministry of Finance in reporting to the Foreign Minister about the discussions held with Warburg clearly reflects an attitude of respect towards the man and his suggestions 14 . The author of the report even promises to inform the Minister of the Interior, the Foreign Minister and even the Fuehrer's Deputy, Rudolf Hess, about further negotiations 15 . It is hardly surprising that the authorities followed the efforts of the leader of the Hilfsverein closely, since they anticipated not only an increase in the emigration of Jews from Germany but also a growth in exports, and the concomitant influx of foreign currency from world Jewry 16 .
In accordance with Warburg's suggestion, an international financial organisation, the Liquidation Bank, was to be established, serving as the trustee for Jewish property in Germany, dealing with the sale of Jewish property and arranging for the proceeds to be transferred to the emigrants abroad 17 . The new institution was to be funded from abroad, particularly by West European and American Jewry 18 . The transfer of assets abroad was to be effected through a world-wide distribution of German-made products 19 . It was taken for granted that the Liquidation Bank planned to act with the full co-operation of the international guarantors of its operating capital as well as with that of the German Government. Despite the fact that every effort was made to ensure that the details of the negotiations with the authorities should remain secret 20 , Warburg was not acting on his own. The members of the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) 21 had participated in the discussions with government representatives and the leaders of Anglo-Jewry also knew of the matter 22 . When the details of the plan became known to the leaders of American Jewry they most adamantly opposed any action which would further export of German goods and flatly refused to allocate funds for the establishment of the Liquidation Bank 23 . Influenced by this negative reaction, the Anglo-Jewish leaders retracted their support for Warburg's project and the matter was shelved.
But the members of the Hilfsverein did not despair, and even developed a sense of mission, feeling that it was incumbent upon the Jews to contribute to the technological and economic advance of the Latin American countries. They claimed that Brazil, Chile, Peru and even Argentina were in great need of first-rate professionals who could improve production systems and bring about the more efficient utilisation of these countries' abundant natural resources. 'Here German Jews will find a challenge far greater than simply supporting themselves; here they can play a historic role by helping to industrialise an area which is one of the world's richest in raw materials.' 24. However, while presenting this new awareness of commitment to a distant continent they were anxious to safeguard their attachment to Germany, the land, the nation and the culture. 'It is no unusual occurrence,' Max Warburg said, 'to find that a Jew has taken a bag of German soil with him as a remembrance of his fatherland.' 25 The individuals link persisted even though he was forced to leave Germany.
In the light of the events of September 1935, the leaders of the Hilfsverein became increasingly aware of the fact that the emigrants' Jewish consciousness should be intensified, and that their own role did not end with providing material support, giving advice, assisting in technical arrangements and arranging for professional and linguistic training. Thus the Hilfsverein encouraged the emigrants to preserve their attachment to Jewish traditions and attempted to ensure that a rabbi, a cantor and a ritual slaughterer accompanied each of their groups 26 . It endeavoured to prevent the dispersion of the stream of emigration, as far as this was possible, with the object of preventing the emigrants' assimilation within their new environment. For the same reason it was interested in directing the emigrants to places located near Jewish centres 27 . The organisation also caned upon the emigrants to display a spirit of friendship and co-operation towards these communities and to participate in their institutions. These efforts reflected the Association's desire to give a Jewish character to the stof emigration.
Thus the non-Zionist organisations adhered simultaneously to various conflicting principles; they cultivated their sense of German identity while at the same time reinforcing the Jewish element in their activities. On the one hand, they encouraged their members to remain in Germany, while on the other, they took initiatives to enable those who wished to do so to leave the country and put down new roots abroad. They also developed a sense of mission, contending that the emigrants had an historic task to fulfil in helping underdeveloped countries to advance. There can be no doubt that the multiplicity of approaches and confusion of slogans did not help them to find their way, once their world had crumbled as a result of the annulment of the laws of emancipation.
5 Files of the Hamburg Jewish Community, September 24, 1935, Vol. 22, Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem, AHW/297.
6 Files of the Regensburg Jewish Community, not dated (1935?), Ibi., A/176 (253).
7 Die Arbeit des Hilfsvereins der Juden in Deutschland 1934ΓÇô1935, Berlin, 1936, pp. 6ΓÇô8 (hereafter ΓÇô Hilfsverein).
8 Hilfsverein 1935ΓÇô1936, p. 13.
9 Ibid. , p. 20.
10 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 18.
11 Korrespondenzblat ueber Ausswanderungs- und Siedlungswesen, Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland, Berlin, September 1935, (hereafter - Korrespondenzblatt).
12 See Martin Rosenblueth to Georg Landauer, November 19, 1935; Leo Hermann to Rosenblueth, December 11, 1935, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter ΓÇô CZA), S 25/9810.
See also the report of February 13, 1936 of the ΓÇ£Central British Fund for German JewryΓÇ¥, London (hereafter ΓÇô CBFA).
13 Simon Marks, the British Zionist leader, headed the activities on behalf of German Jews.
See his letter to Chaim Weizmann, December 31, 1935, S 25/9810.
14 See the report of the German Ministry of Finance of February 18, 1936, to be found in the collection of documents of the German Foreign Office (hereafter ΓÇô GFOC), AA Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland, Inland II, A 13, Vol. 1, 1930ΓÇô1937, photocopies in Yad Vashem Archives (hereafter ΓÇô YVA) JM/3138.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Werner Senator to Rosenblueth, November 5, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810.
18 Rosenblueth to Landauer, November 13 and Landauer to Rosenblueth, December 24, 1935. See also the appendix of J. L. Cohen, CZA, S 25/9810.
19 Marks to Weizmann, December 31, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810.
20 Rosenblueth to Landauer, December 23, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810.
21 Landauer to Senator, December 31, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810.
22 Rosenblueth to Landauer, November 19, 1935; and compare Rosenblueth to Adler-Rudel, September 6, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810.
23 Herbert Samuel's report about his visit to America as the head of a delegation of British Jewish leaders, December 13, 1936, CBFA, London. See also another report, seemingly of J. L. Cohen CZA, S 25/9810.
24 Korrespondenzblatt , September 1936, p. 10.
25 Hilfsverein 1936, p. 5.
26 See conversation between the author and Arthur Prinz, one of the senior officials of the Hilfsverein , November 22, 1967.
